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Notes
PUNISHMENT BY THE PEOPLE:
RETHINKING THE JURY’S POLITICAL ROLE
IN ASSIGNING PUNITIVE DAMAGES
NATHAN SETH CHAPMAN
INTRODUCTION
In the past decade the Supreme Court did something—twice—it
has never done before: it struck down a punitive damages award for
violating the United States Constitution.1 In each case, the awards
had been determined by an elaborate choreography, including the
parties and their respective counsel, a jury of disinterested laypeople,
and a trial judge. Moreover, the jury in each case made a moral
judgment consistent with state constitutional requirements about how
much money the defendant should be required to pay as punishment
for wrongdoing.2 But the United States Supreme Court found both
punishments “grossly excessive,”3 violating the Due Process Clause of

Copyright © 2007 by Nathan Seth Chapman.
1. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 429 (2003) (“The
punitive award of $145 million, therefore, was neither reasonable nor proportionate to the
wrong committed, and it was an irrational and arbitrary deprivation of the property of the
defendant.”); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 585–86 (1996) (“[W]e are fully
convinced that the grossly excessive award imposed in this case transcends the constitutional
limit.”). But see Sw. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Danaher, 238 U.S. 482, 491 (1915) (invalidating a
statutory award for $6,300 against a telephone company for discrimination against a customer
because the award “was so plainly arbitrary and oppressive as to be nothing short of a taking of
its property without due process of law”).
2. In Gore, the Alabama Supreme Court remitted the $4 million punitive damages award
entered on the jury verdict to $2 million after “thoroughly and painstakingly reviewing [the] jury
award.” BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 646 So. 2d 619, 629 (Ala. 1994). In Campbell, the
Supreme Court of Utah reinstated a $145 million jury punitive damages award that the trial
judge had remitted to $25 million. Campbell v. State Farm, 65 P.3d 1134, 1141, 1171–72 (Utah
2001).
3. In TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993), the Supreme Court
first applied the “grossly excessive” test to a punitive damages award. Id. at 458 (borrowing the
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4
the Fourteenth Amendment. The next time the Court reviews the
constitutionality of a punitive damages award it should consider that
it may do more than upset the jury’s historical role if it pulls the rug
out from under the jury’s award. The Court’s current approach may
be tipping a political balance in favor of the unelected federal
judiciary. The jury plays an important political role as a
counterbalance to the professional judiciary, particularly as a source
of morality.
This Note argues that the jury’s most historically significant
purpose is not given adequate respect in current punitive damages
doctrine. Even the Justices who recognize the jury’s traditional role in
5
assigning punitive damages neglect the political rationale for this
historical role. Particularly by applying community moral standards to
its judgments, the American jury has consistently served as a
counterbalance to the professional judiciary. Accordingly, this Note
asserts that the jury’s punitive damages award should be given some
deference by federal appellate courts, and that courts can do so
without compromising Fourteenth Amendment limits on punitive
discretion.
Part I narrates the jury’s function in assigning civil punishment,
from its origins as a monarchical pawn to its role—in the words of the
Supreme Court—as “a quintessential government body . . . . [that]
exercises the power of the court and of the government that confers
6
the court’s jurisdiction.” To assess the scope of the jury’s political
role, Part I explores the jury’s history in general, not only its role in
the imposition of punitive damages. It releases the reader’s

term of art from Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212 U.S. 86, 111 (1909), a decision about
unconstitutional fines).
4. See Campbell, 538 U.S. at 429 (“The punitive award of $145 million, therefore, was
neither reasonable nor proportionate to the wrong committed, and it was an irrational and
arbitrary deprivation of the property of the defendant.”); Gore, 517 U.S. at 585–86 (finding a
“grossly excessive” punitive damage award violative of the Fourteenth Amendment).
5. Gore, 517 U.S. at 600 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“At the time of adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment, it was well understood that punitive damages represent the assessment
by the jury, as the voice of the community, of the measure of punishment the defendant
deserved.”); id. at 613 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s readiness to superintend statecourt punitive damages awards is all the more puzzling in view of the Court’s longstanding
reluctance to countenance review, even by courts of appeals, of the size of verdicts returned by
juries in federal district court proceedings.”).
6. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 624 (1991). Also, “the jury system
performs the critical governmental functions of guarding the rights of litigants and ‘ensur[ing]
continued acceptance of the laws by all of the people.’” Id. (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S.
400, 407 (1991)).
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imagination from the confines of an empirical approach that might be
missing the forest of the jury’s political function for the trees of
predictability and efficiency.
Part II argues that the jury’s political role is constitutional. The
Constitution’s text,7 the balance of powers it creates, and various
8
constitutional doctrines all point to the jury’s important political role
in the republic as a democratic source of morality in the law.9
Recognizing the jury’s political role is a partial, albeit insufficient,
solution to the ongoing scholarly debates over how to inject
democratic values into the constitutional adjudicative process and
how to instill constitutional virtues into the citizenry.
Part III details the current due process standards for punitive
damages and the constitutional concerns implicated by unfair punitive
damages awards. The Court has limited the jury’s power to punish
civil wrongdoing in two significant ways: it has suggested that a
punitive damages award exceeding nine times the amount of
compensatory damages is rarely constitutional,10 and it has held that
neither trial judges nor appellate courts should defer to a jury’s
assessment of reprehensibility.11 The Court’s overriding concern is

7. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; U.S. CONST. amend. VII. The Seventh Amendment has not
been applied to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 192
n.6 (1974). Both federal and state criminal trials require a jury because the Sixth Amendment is
applied against the states via the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968), unless an accused elects to waive a jury trial, Patton v.
United States, 281 U.S. 276, 308 (1930).
8. See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 146 (1994) (prohibiting genderbased discrimination in jury selection); Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 363–64 (1991)
(allowing trial judges to weigh justifications for peremptory challenges that lead to
disproportionate exclusion of members of certain ethnic groups); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.
79, 84 (1986) (prohibiting the denial of jury participation on account of race).
9. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 607–09 (2002) (holding that the jury must find the
aggravating factors that warrant a death sentence); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 33–34
(1973) (requiring the jury to determine whether material’s dominant theme appeals to a
prurient interest and violates community standards of decency, and so amounts to unprotected
obscenity under the First Amendment); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280–81 (1964)
(allowing instructions to the jury to determine whether a false statement about a public official
was made with malice, and thus not protected by the First Amendment).
10. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003) (“Our
jurisprudence and the principles it has now established demonstrate, however, that, in practice,
few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a
significant degree, will satisfy due process.”).
11. Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Group, 532 U.S. 424, 436 (2001) (“[C]ourts of
appeals should apply a de novo standard of review when passing on district courts’
determinations of the constitutionality of punitive damages awards.”).
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fairness: Civil defendants who are subjected to a completely
unpredictable punishment are not fairly afforded the protection of
12
the rule of law.
Finally, Part IV suggests that, consistent with the jury’s political
function, the Court should give juries more deference to apply
community standards of morality in the imposition of punitive
damages. Instead of de novo application of the Gore guideposts, the
Court should adopt one of three doctrinal options: (1) an “abuse of
discretion” review with reference to the Gore guideposts, (2) the
traditional “clearly arbitrary” or “clearly excessive” standard of
review, or (3) a hybrid rule requiring the jury to apply the Gore
guideposts and judicial review for “abuse of discretion.” After
analyzing the practical and constitutional strengths and weaknesses of
each, this Note ultimately recommends the last option.
I. THE JURY’S STORY REVEALS ITS ESSENTIALLY
POLITICAL CHARACTER
The American jury’s story is steeped in political drama. This Part
recounts the chapters of the jury’s story that are necessary to
understand what is at stake when the professional judiciary ignores a
jury’s punitive damages award. The history of the American jury is
one facet of the ongoing story of American self-determination; the
constant flux in the scope and degree of power exercised by the jury
vis-à-vis the professional judge is evidence of America’s singular and
ongoing attempt to make popular sovereignty work.
A. The Jury’s Origin: The Rise of Popular Sovereignty
The clearest starting point of what became the American jury is
probably the Frankish inquisitio, which evolved into the judgment
jury after its introduction to Great Britain.13 The most important facet
12. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 587 (1996) (Breyer, J., concurring)
(“Requiring the application of law, rather than a decisionmaker’s caprice, does more than
simply provide citizens notice of what actions may subject them to punishment; it also helps to
assure the uniform general treatment of similarly situated persons that is the essence of law
itself.”).
13. LLOYD E. MOORE, THE JURY: TOOL OF KINGS, PALLADIUM OF LIBERTY 14 (2d ed.
1988). But see VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 23 (1986) (recounting
early Anglo-Saxon inquisitions as being the first instances of a jury in English legal history).
Scholars Maitland and Thayer focus on the legacy of the Normans in the development of the
jury, while Dawson focuses on the pre-Norman Anglo-Saxon tradition as the jury’s source.
Compare 1 SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF
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of the inquisitio for the purposes of this Note is that it operated at the
14
whim of the King. Although members swore to testify to the truth
regardless of its impact on the King,15 because an inquisitio was only
available if the King permitted, the crown could prevent any
16
damaging judgments by refusing to institute an inquisitio. Further, a
sort of judicial review guaranteed the inquisitio’s loyalty to the
Crown: unless they ruled for the King, members of an inquisitio
suspected of perjury were subject to an ordeal.17 But by the end of the
fourteenth century, partly due to a prohibition of ecclesiastical
18
participation in the ordeal, and perhaps partly due to the economic
prudence of employing laymen,19 the jury largely had evolved from a
panel of witnesses into a judgment jury.20
Although the early judgment jury bore a resemblance to the
modern American jury—for instance, it typically comprised twelve
lay persons and was empowered to make decisions of fact—it had
several distinctions.21 First, the purpose of a local jury early on was to
serve as a character witness or eyewitness. By the period’s end,
however, the jury’s primary purpose was to empower the community
affected by the legal dispute to effectuate its own notions of fairness.
Second, the judgment jury frequently was composed of members of
the presenting jury.22 The presenting jury was a holdover from the
compurgator jury, which essentially ratified the government’s
accusations based on first-hand experience with the facts. Thus, it
functioned like a modern grand jury. It was assumed this experience
would facilitate a just deliberation of the full merits of the case, and
thus many presentment members were retained as jurors of the same

ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 74 (Lawbook Exchange 1996) (2d ed.1898),
and JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON
LAW 50 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1898), with JOHN P. DAWSON, A HISTORY OF LAY
JUDGES 118–20 (1960).
14. MOORE, supra note 13, at 14.
15. Id. at 16.
16. Id. at 14.
17. Id.
18. Stephan Landsman, The Civil Jury in America: Scenes from an Unappreciated History,
44 HASTINGS L.J. 579, 584 (1992).
19. DAWSON, supra note 13, at 293.
20. MOORE, supra note 13, at 56.
21. See id. at 65–68 (detailing the evolution of jury composition from the fifteenth to the
eighteenth centuries, including jury size, social status of jurors, exemptions, and challenges
available to counsel).
22. HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 13, at 28.
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23
trial. Third, and most importantly here, the Crown ensured the
partiality of juries to its own agenda through two procedural
mechanisms: jurors were selected by a sheriff who “in respect of his
24
allegiance . . . ought to favor the king,” and until the remarkable trial
of Quaker William Penn in 1670, jurors were frequently put under
overwhelming pressure to comply with a judge’s “suggestions.”25
The story of the Penn trial and the subsequent habeas corpus
action brought by Edward Bushell, one of the Penn jurors, is often
recounted as the forebear of the truly independent jury. The Penn
jurors were deprived of food, water, and a chamber pot until they
rendered a proper verdict against the defendant for unlawfully
preaching in public as a non-Anglican. Penn, acting as his own
counsel, encouraged the jurors to withstand the judge’s pressure and
vote their consciences, as befitting subjects of the Great Charter.26
After days of foul conditions and deprivation, during which several of
the jurors fell ill, the jury ultimately acquitted Penn of unlawfully
preaching in public.27 The court immediately sent every juror to
Newgate prison for contempt of court. Edward Bushell, considered
the jury’s leading voice, won his habeas corpus action in light of the
court’s jury abuse, and ultimately the jury’s decision was affirmed and
enforced.
28
Little did Bushell know that the legacy of his habeas case,
unremarkable except for its context, would greatly surpass that of
Penn’s case. Chief Justice of Common Pleas Sir John Vaughan
memorialized the jury’s ability to make an independent decision
29
without fear of judicial reprisal. The decision cemented a barrier
between the function of the jury and the function of the professional
judiciary. Since then, the common law has respected a jury’s decision

23. Id.
24. W. FORSYTHE, HISTORY OF TRIAL BY JURY 191 n.1 (Lawbook Exchange 1994) (1875).
25. See HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 13, at 28 (“It was not until after juror Bushell won his
case that jurors became truly immune to legal sanctions concerning their verdicts.”); see also
MOORE, supra note 13, at 72–73 (describing the Star Court’s imposition of fines for verdicts of
acquittal); id. at 76–77 (detailing the potential penalties for attaint, or rendering a false verdict).
26. GODFREY D. LEHMAN, WE THE JURY . . . THE IMPACT OF JURORS ON OUR BASIC
FREEDOMS 45–46 (1997) (presenting that portion of the Penn trial in narrative form).
27. Id. at 61. Juries at this time frequently returned special verdicts, finding the facts of a
case but leaving the application of law to the judge. MOORE, supra note 13, at 71.
28. Bushell’s Case, (1670) 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P.).
29. Landsman, supra note 18, at 590.
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regarding how (and sometimes whether) the law governing them
applies to a set of facts arising from its community.
30
Bushell’s Case set the stage for the Seven Bishops Case in 1688,
in which a jury acquitted a group of Anglican bishops of seditious
31
libel. The case launched the Glorious Revolution, established the
jury as a “‘bulwark of liberty’” against monarchal abuse, and
32
prompted a slew of popular treatises lauding the jury. In both the
Penn case and the Seven Bishops Case, the jury nullified legislation
and rebuffed an abusive professional judiciary.
In 1763, while American juries were playing an important role in
the colonies’ struggle for self-rule, English juries first awarded
modern punitive damages as a remedy for civil wrongdoing in the
33
34
companion cases of Wilkes v. Wood and Huckle v. Money. In
Wilkes, the plaintiff publisher of an allegedly libelous pamphlet, The
North Briton,35 succeeded with an action for trespass against the
King’s agents who searched and seized his property on a general
36
warrant. A relatively enormous jury award (£1000) was allowed as
punishment, deterrence, and an expression of juror disgust.37 In
Huckle v. Money, the same pamphlet’s printer was illegally seized and
imprisoned. Lord Camden upheld a £300 award despite only £20
worth of damages, believing the jury justified in imposing a severe
sanction against an exercise of arbitrary power that threatened liberty
under the Magna Carta of all Englishmen. He postulated:
[I]t is very dangerous for the Judges to intermeddle in damages for
torts; it must be a glaring case indeed of outrageous damages in a

30. Seven Bishops Case, (1688) 87 Eng. Rep. 136 (K.B.).
31. Landsman, supra note 18, at 590.
32. Id. at 590–91 (quoting Austin Wakeman Scott, Trial by Jury and the Reform of Civil
Procedure, 31 HARV. L. REV. 669, 676 (1918)).
33. Wilkes v. Wood, (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (K.B.).
34. Huckle v. Money, (1763) 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (K.B.).
35. Wilkes, 98 Eng. Rep. at 493.
36. There is disagreement about the value of the award compared to today’s awards,
depending on the method used to estimate the inflation rate. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore,
517 U.S. 559, 594–95, 597–98 (1996) (Breyer, J., concurring) (finding divergent results using
different methods to calculate the present day value of the jury awards in Wilkes and Huckle).
37. Wilkes, 98 Eng. Rep. at 498–99 (Lord Camden wrote, “[A] jury have [sic] it in their
power to give damages for more than the injury received. Damages are designed not only as a
satisfaction to the injured person, but likewise as a punishment to the guilty, to deter from any
such proceeding for the future, and as a proof of the detestation of the jury to the action
itself.”).
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tort, and which all mankind at first blush must think so, to induce a
38
Court to grant a new trial for excessive damages.

Even though the jury long before had evolved into a neutral,
39
objective fact finder, Lord Camden’s deference to the jury’s award
in Wilkes may have extended the traditional common law reliance on
the juror’s personal knowledge of the nature of the harm and the
40
relative blameworthiness of the defendant.
Juries and judges had been awarding punitive damages in select
categories of cases since before 1700, but after Wilkes and Huckle,
punitive damages were assessed with increasing frequency and in new
41
42
types of cases. Besides physical injury, multiple damages were
43
awarded for wounded honor and breached promises. The jury
furthered the crusade begun in the North Britain cases against
government abuse,44 and American juries added corporate
45
malfeasance to the list of targets. In the latter two types of cases, the
jury responded to a defendant’s behavior that threatened the liberty
of the whole community through an abuse of political or economic
advantage.46 This popular sentiment later dovetailed with the jury’s
rise in America as an instrument of democracy.
38. Huckle, 95 Eng. Rep. at 769.
39. Alan Calnan, Ending the Punitive Damage Debate, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 101, 106–07
(1995).
40. See 1 LINDA L. SCHLUETER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES 6 n.31 (5th ed. 2005) (“Juries under
early English common law typically consisted of townsmen who were more familiar with the
nature of the dispute and the harm committed than the judge himself.”).
41. Calnan, supra note 39, at 107.
42. See Towle v. Blake, 48 N.H. 92, 96 (1868) (punishing violent tort); Grey v. Grant,
(1764) 95 Eng. Rep. 794, 795 (K.B.) (justifying punitive damages as an alternative to a duel
when one “gentleman” has struck another).
43. See Severance v. Hilton, 32 N.H. 289, 291 (1855) (punishing malicious slander);
Davidson v. Goodall, 18 N.H. 423, 430–31 (1846) (punishing seduction); Chesley v. Chesley, 10
N.H. 327, 328 (1839) (punishing breach of a promise to marry).
44. See Benson v. Frederick, (1776) 97 Eng. Rep. 1130, 1130 (K.B.) (punishing a
government agent for wrongly stripping and lashing the plaintiff); Beardmore v. Carrington,
(1764) 95 Eng. Rep. 790, 793–94 (K.B.) (punishing an illegal search and seizure).
45. See Hopkins v. Atl. & Saint Lawrence R.R., 36 N.H. 9, 10–11 (1857) (punishing a
railroad’s negligent care of trains); Varillat v. New Orleans & Carrollton R.R., 10 La. Ann. 88,
88–89 (1855) (punishing a negligent railroad employee).
46. The judge’s rationale in Huckle v. Money resonates this tone:
[T]he personal injury done to him was very small, so that if the jury had been
confined by their oath to consider the mere personal injury only, perhaps 20l.
damages would have been thought damages sufficient; but the small injury done to
the plaintiff, or the inconsiderableness of his station and rank in life did not appear to
the jury in that striking light in which the great point of law touching the liberty of the
subject appeared to them at the trial; they saw a magistrate over all the King’s

03__CHAPMAN.DOC

2007]

3/9/2007 7:48 AM

PUNITIVE DAMAGES

1127

B. American Colonial Developments
In each American colony, almost from inception, the jury
emerged as a significant local and popular shield against monarchal
abuse of the citizenry. One commentator notes that “[t]he right to
trial by jury was probably the only one universally secured by the first
47
American state constitutions.” Each colony had a unique system of
justice, and each colony presents distinct stories of heroic and
rebellious juries.
In Massachusetts, for example, juries enjoyed a broad scope of
authority. The jury was an important part of a legal regime dedicated
to infusing the law with community morality over issues ranging from
creditor-debtor relations to Sabbath breaking.48 The greatest
indication of the jury’s power is that “whereas modern juries must
follow the law as stated to them by the court, juries in prerevolutionary Massachusetts could ignore judges’ instructions on the
law and decide the law by themselves in both civil and criminal
cases.”49 William E. Nelson attributes the difference between the
jury’s power in Massachusetts and in most other common law systems
to Massachusetts’s “substantial ethical unity and economic and social
stability”; as “the unity and stability broke down near the end of the
turn of the [nineteenth] century, the jury system began to function
less efficiently and with less certainty and predictability.”50
Experience in the colonies was not homogenous. Although in
some colonies, such as Virginia, the jury probably had less power than
the justice of the peace, in all cases, “historical evidence makes it
clear not only that people throughout America were preoccupied

subjects, exercising arbitrary power, violating Magna Charta, and attempting to
destroy the liberty of the kingdom, by insisting upon the legality of this general
warrant before them; they heard the King’s Counsel, and saw the solicitor of the
Treasury endeavouring to support and maintain the legality of the warrant in a
tyrannical and severe manner. These are the ideas which struck the jury on the trial;
and I think they have done right in giving exemplary damages.
(1763) 95 Eng. Rep. 768, 768–69 (K.B.).
47. LEONARD W. LEVY, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN
HISTORY: LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION 281 (Torchbook 1963) (1960), quoted in Stephan
Landsman, The History and Objectives of the Civil Jury System, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE
CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 22, 36 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993).
48. WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF
LEGAL CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760–1830, at 3–6 (1994).
49. Id. at 3.
50. Id. at 8.
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with safeguarding the jury but that they relied on the jury to restrain
51
government.”
Perhaps most famously, New York hosted the famous trial of
publisher John Peter Zenger in 1735 for seditious libel. He allegedly
accused Governor William Cosby “of corruption, misfeasance, and
52
usurpation of the right to jury trial.” The judge’s instructions gave
the jury no discretion to decide whether Zenger’s publication was
legal or illegal. Rather, the judge effectively required a conviction as
53
long as the jury found that Zenger in fact published the material.
Zenger’s counsel urged the jury to acquit, however, arguing that the
publication was legal if the published accusations were true.54 The jury
ignored the judge’s instruction and acquitted Zenger. The case
exemplifies the function of the colonial jury as a check on an
unelected judiciary.55
In addition to the Zenger case, numerous attempts by colonial
governors to control the courts, often by limiting jury trials, were
consistently rebuffed in the middle of the eighteenth century. By the
time of the Revolution, the number of jury trials had actually
increased in most jurisdictions and jury trials were available in
admiralty and vice admiralty courts. As Stephan Landsman notes,
“[i]n the period between the 1760s and the Revolution, the jury
represented the most effective means available to secure the
independence and integrity of the judicial branch of the colonial
government.”56
Besides the colonial jury experience, the founding generation’s
words also suggest the jury’s political role as originally intended in the
Constitution. The Fifth Resolution of the First Continental Congress
of 1774 demanded the jury as each colony’s political right vis-à-vis the
Empire: “‘[T]he respective colonies are entitled to . . . the great and
inestimable privilege of being tried by their peers of the

51. Landsman, supra note 47, at 33.
52. Landsman, supra note 18, at 593.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See id. (“The jury verdict acquitting Zenger established that: the press should be free to
criticize the government, truth should be a defense to libel charges, judges do not necessarily
have absolute control over questions they designate as ‘legal,’ and colonial juries, like their
English counterparts, were fully capable of defending fundamental rights.”).
56. Id. at 596.
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57
vicinage . . . .’” The Second Continental Congress’s Declaration of
the Causes and Necessity of Taking Up Arms,58 echoed this
sentiment, and denial of the “benefits of trial by jury” was one of the
grievances against the colonies listed in the Declaration of
Independence.59
These grievances highlight both a similarity, and an important
difference, between the role of the jury in the colonies and its role
after the War for Independence. The jury continued to perform a
political function, particularly in relation to a professional and often
unelected judiciary. But whereas the colonial jury was in many ways
the only democratic institution available to protect against abuses by
what was increasingly considered a foreign occupier, Congress was
chosen to bear the weight of the new popular sovereignty conceived
by the Framers. The jury was thus no longer necessary to counterbalance an abusive monarch. Or, more cynically, the same jury that
was useful for rebels might be threatening to new governors. Even so,
Professor Akhil Amar sums up the jury’s identity after American
Independence: “Juries were, in a sense, the people themselves, triedand-true embodiments of late-eighteenth-century republican
ideology.”60 Even though the jury’s political role necessarily evolved
in the popular sovereignty, it did not vanish.

C. The Jury’s Experience in the United States
Professor Stephan Landsman plots three eras of the jury in the
American republic. In the first era (1776–1840), the jury, consistent
with its identity as an element of the judiciary, stabilized partisan
61
divisions. Although the Federalists and Republicans bickered about
the role of the jury, in most cases a compromise was reached that
reasserted the strength of the jury: the Massachusetts legislature

57. Id. (quoting DECLARATION AND RESOLVES OF THE FIRST CONTINENTAL CONGRESS
(1774), reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES: DOCUMENTARY ORIGINS OF INDIVIDUAL
LIBERTIES IN THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND BILL OF RIGHTS 272, 278 (Richard L.
Perry & John C. Cooper eds., 1952)).
58. Id.
59. Landsman, supra note 47, at 36.
60. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 234 (2005).
61. See Landsman, supra note 47, at 39–43 (“[The jury] became an instrument of
compromise that tempered both the ardent Federalist desire for a strong judiciary and the
Republican radicals’ thirst for a simplified law without courtrooms or lawyers.”).
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62
preserved the jury’s right to decide issues of law, Judge Addison of
Pennsylvania was impeached for interfering with the jury,63 and
Justice Samuel Chase was prosecuted (but eventually acquitted) for
“invad[ing] the province of the jury” by removing certain issues from
its consideration.64 The populace specifically likened Chase to the
overreaching judges in the Zenger and Seven Bishops cases;65 such
zeal endorsed Alexis de Tocqueville’s view that the jury was a
66
repository of power in the governed.
In the second jury era (1840–1900), the jury’s political role was
67
limited for the sake of industrial development. The introduction of
the doctrine of contributory negligence allowed judges to scrutinize
plaintiff behavior and prevent many issues from ever reaching the
jury, who, unlike judges, was presumed unable to steel itself against
compassion for the “feeble, and apparently oppressed” individual
victims of industrial (particularly railroad) enterprises.68 In short, it
was assumed that the jury was “incapable of comprehending the new
industrial reality”69 and would have qualms with the necessity of
breaking some proverbial eggs to make the omelet of an advanced
society. The use of contributory negligence to shut juries out of the
legal decision-making process may not have been universal, but
probably accelerated the jury’s deterioration beginning in the early
1900s.
The third jury era observed by Landsman encompasses the
twentieth century, in which scholars focused on the jury’s efficiency,
first rhetorically, then with social science studies. Charles E. Clark
submitted early realist theories of jury inefficiency to limited
empirical study in the 1930s and concluded that the twelve-person,
unanimous jury and the procedures attendant wasted judicial time

62. See id. at 41 (“Massachusetts moderates . . . insist[ed] that juries retain the sort of
powers they had previously held.”).
63. Id. at 40.
64. Id. at 42–43.
65. Id. at 42.
66. Id. at 43 (“In Democracy in America, Alexis de Tocqueville concludes that the
American jury of the 1830s was a fundamentally ‘political institution,’ whose primary function
was to place political power in the hands of the governed.”).
67. See id. at 43–47 (“Many of the new tort rules [introduced in the nineteenth century]
have been said to reflect the perceptions of the judges—who frequently saw the needs of the
industrialists as paramount—rather than more liberal and humanistic views.”).
68. Id. at 45–46 (quoting Haring v. N.Y. & Erie R.R., 13 Barb. 2, 15–16 (N.Y. Gen Term
1852)).
69. Id. at 44.
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and resources, “‘whatever the political, psychological or
70
jurisprudential values of the jury.’” Support for his findings faltered,
and they were put to rest definitively by Hans Zeisel and Harry
Kalven’s University of Chicago Jury Project, which began in the
1950s.71 The Project asserted that the difference in time between
bench and jury trials could be substantially mitigated by “a series of
72
case and trial management techniques.” Also, Zeisel and Kalven’s
conclusion that judges and juries usually agree have been reconfirmed
recently in the context of punitive damages: studies suggest that
judges and juries do not “differ in the rate at which they award
punitive damages, or in the central relation between the size of
punitive awards and compensatory awards.”73 Ultimately, unlike
Clark, Zeisel and Kalven factored into their inquiry the political and
normative role of the jury, and their findings were met with general
approval.
The twentieth century has also seen the jury’s role in the civil
context limited by the advent of a number of trial procedures and
institutional developments. For the sake of efficiency, predictability,
or institutional control, issues are regularly kept from the jury.74 For
instance, Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows the
judge to forgo jury review of the case with a summary judgment
ruling,75 and Rule 50(b) allows the judge to overrule the jury
notwithstanding the verdict.76 These measures may be viewed as the
fruit of jury mistrust. More positively, though, they represent an
attempt to hone the adversarial system and ensure that “[t]he jury is
the most neutral and passive decisionmaker available.”77

70. Charles E. Clark & Harry Shulman, Jury Trial in Civil Cases—A Study in Judicial
Administration, 43 YALE L.J. 867, 884 (1934) (emphasis added).
71. See Landsman, supra note 47, at 50–51 (“Zeisel and his colleagues found that, while
jury trials are approximately 40 percent longer than bench trials, the cost of the jury system is
more than justified by the values it introduces into the trial process.”).
72. Id.
73. Theodore Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages: An Empirical Study i
(Nov. 1, 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duke Law Journal), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=248419 (last visited Jan. 28, 2007).
74. See generally ELLEN E. SWARD, THE DECLINE OF THE CIVIL JURY 243–349 (2001)
(discussing mechanisms that curtail the modern jury’s power and involvement in dispute
resolution).
75. FED. R. CIV. P. 56.
76. FED. R. CIV. P. 50(b).
77. Stephan Landsman, The Civil Jury in America, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 285, 288
(1999).
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Numerous categories of legal disputes now evade the jury in
78
favor of an administrative agency or an arbitral tribunal. But the
degree to which either of these represents a restriction on the jury is
unclear. Administrative adjudications are usually completed by an
administrative official without a jury, but they are not entirely out of
the judiciary’s province because they are usually reviewed for
constitutionality by an Article III court. So in administrative
adjudications, the jury’s political clout is diminished vis-à-vis the
power of the federal judiciary. But there is a caveat: many
administrative proceedings either would not exist without an
administrative mechanism, or would not require a jury trial in the
absence of agency oversight. As to arbitrations, private parties who
choose to forgo a jury trial by opting for arbitration may not have
reached an agreement in the first place without stipulating to an
arbitration clause. So, although the rise of alternative dispute
resolution and agency adjudication has displaced the jury somewhat,
not every case that lands in one of those arenas would have been a
controversy but for those arenas’ existence.
Even though the American jury’s political role was barely
discernable in the Frankish inquisito, it emerged from English history
to its full height in Massachusetts and other colonies, and then
necessarily evolved into an integral part of the American republic.
Although the jury’s influence has been mitigated and threatened over
the century, its constitutional role has blossomed in many ways over
the last fifty years.
II. THE CONSTITUTION AND THE JURY
The jury’s current political role as a democratic and local check
on federal judges, although not evident from the text of the
Constitution, is exhibited by the structure of the powers created by
the Constitution. As current constitutional doctrine across a number
of fields suggests, the jury’s clearest political responsibility is to inject
community morality into the application of the law.
A. History and Text of the Seventh Amendment
The Constitution, as signed by the Continental Congress on
September 17, 1787, said little about juries. It never could have been
78. See SWARD, supra note 74, at 207. Approximately 340,000 cases per year are
adjudicated administratively. Id.
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ratified, however, without amendments safeguarding the common law
right to jury trial. These amendments represented a compromise
between the Federalists and Antifederalists. Federalist leader
Alexander Hamilton noted that all the Framers agreed on “the value
79
they set upon the trial by jury.” What distinguished the parties’
positions was that the Federalists believed there is no “inseparable
connection between the existence of liberty and the trial by jury in
civil cases,”80 but that Congress, as the people’s voice, would
guarantee the jury’s longevity.81
The Antifederalists, however, opposed the Constitution if an
amendment securing civil juries was not added, often echoing the
language of Blackstone:
The impartial administration of justice, which secures both our
persons and our properties, is the great end of civil society. But if
that be entirely entrusted to the magistracy, a select body of men,
and those generally selected by the prince or such as enjoy the
highest offices in the state, their decisions, in spite of their own
natural integrity, will have frequently an involuntary bias towards
those of their own rank and dignity; it is not to be expected from
human nature that the few should be always attentive to the interests
82
and good of the many.

On this issue, the nation sided with the Antifederalists. The Bill
of Rights guaranteed numerous individual rights designed to
maximize not only freedom from state coercion, but public
participation in the new republican government. And, “[t]he jury
summed up—indeed embodied—the ideals of populism, federalism,
and civic virtue that were the essence of the original Bill of Rights.”83
Specifically, the Seventh Amendment preserves the right to a jury
trial in most cases, and the Judiciary Act of 1789, which Congress
considered simultaneous with the Seventh Amendment, narrowly
circumscribes the scope of equity at trial, thus necessarily broadening
the scope of jury issues.84

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
(1991).
84.

THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, at 562 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob Cooke ed., 1977).
Id.
Landsman, supra note 18, at 599.
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES *350, *379.
Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1190
Landsman, supra note 18, at 600.
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The text of the Seventh Amendment addresses those ratifiers
concerned that their rights at common law might be abrogated:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no
fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of
85
the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.

It mentions the common law twice explicitly, and “preserve[s]” the
right of trial by jury. Although this adumbration does not clarify
86
whether new kinds of cases require a jury trial, at a minimum, the
Seventh Amendment does not abrogate the pre-Independence right
to a jury trial in civil cases.
But what does the Seventh Amendment, which preserves the
right of civil litigants to trial by a civil jury, have to do with the jury’s
political role vis-à-vis the political branches? Professors Akhil Amar
and Allan Hirsch argue that all voters have an implied Seventh
Amendment right to participate in a jury. To them, jury service is
inextricably linked to self-determination.87 This argument is attractive,
particularly considered in light of de Tocqueville’s assertion that the
jury provides an important tool of educating lay people in the laws
and administration of justice in order to educate them for self-rule.88
The assertion of Professors Amar and Hirsch, even if untenable as a
constitutional argument, is a welcome caution against the American
jury’s slow demise. It is not necessary, however, for one to believe in
an individual right to serve on a jury to view the jury as having a
constitutional role to play as a democratic counterbalance to the
professional judiciary.
B. Structure of the Constitution: the Jury as a Local and
Democratic Counterbalance
Within the constitutional structure, the jury provides a local and
democratic counterbalance to the federal judiciary. This
counterbalance is derived both from the Constitution’s text, as well as

85. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
86. See Chauffeurs, Teamsters, & Helpers Local 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 564–65 (1990)
(“The right to a jury trial includes more than the common-law forms of action recognized in
1791 . . . . The right extends to causes of action created by Congress.”).
87. AKHIL AMAR & ALAN HIRSCH, FOR THE PEOPLE 59–60 (1998).
88. See 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 285 (Phillips Bradley ed.,
Alfred A. Knopf 1946) (1830) (calling the jury a “gratuitous public school”).
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a combination of the text and the architecture of the federal union. In
both cases, the jury operates as a subunit of the federal judiciary and
counterbalances it as a democratic and local institution.
Read in light of the Bill of Rights, Article III implies that the
civil jury, as a subunit of the federal courts, is a democratic
counterbalance to judges. Article III vests “[t]he judicial Power of the
United States . . . in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts
as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”89 This
same “Judicial power” does not extend to certain suits in law and
90
equity, pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment. Presumably, then,
this judicial power does extend to those suits at common law for
91
which the Seventh Amendment preserves the right of trial by jury,
and Article III itself provides that the “Trial of all Crimes . . . shall be
by Jury.”92 This interpretation of the judicial power provides
symmetry to the Constitution’s democratic vision: the people
themselves, through juries, apply their own laws enacted through
Congress and the President.
This symmetry is buttressed by the political structure suggested
by the Constitution. Professor Charles Black has noted that, in light
of the “high generality and consequent ambiguity which marks so
many crucial constitutional texts,”93 “the logic of national structure”94
often provides a legitimate and practical constitutional reference.95
The question is whether the civil jury has a political relationship to
the professional judiciary because of the practical structure of the
federal government, either between the national branches or between
the national government and state government. The Constitution,
even if it does not vest part of the judicial power in juries, certainly
preserves their function within the federal judiciary. Anything a jury
does could be done by a judge—insofar as the Constitution preserves
its function, it preserves it at the expense of a judge’s power. As

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
(1969).
94.
95.

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
CHARLES L. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 30
Id. at 11.
Id. at 23.
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Professor Landsman notes, the civil jury “had become the democratic
96
counterbalance to an unelected judiciary.”
Additionally, as “a quintessential government body . . . [that]
exercis[es] the power of the court and of the government that confers
97
the court’s jurisdiction,” the jury’s democratic attributes have grown
in the last half of the twentieth century. That is, the jury—and
therefore the court and government of which the jury is a subset—is
more representative than ever. Although the Supreme Court had held
that the Fourteenth Amendment prevents restricting the jury pool to
whites by 187998 and men by 1975,99 jury composition did not actually
change much until 1986 in Batson v. Kentucky,100 when the Court
ruled that a prosecutor must give a race-neutral reason for excluding
specific jurors when the defendant makes out a prima facie case of
discrimination.101 The Court extended this holding to civil litigants in
102
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co. and criminal defendants in
103
Georgia v. McCollum. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.104 gave the
same right to civil defendants where jurors were excluded because of
105
gender.
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Company explained why the
Fourteenth Amendment protects potential civil jurors from
discrimination: (1) the Fourteenth Amendment generally prohibits
106
government discrimination based on race or gender; (2) the
selection of a jury is always state action because the government, via
the judge and officers of the court, participates in the selection and

96. Stephan Landsman, Appellate Courts and Civil Juries, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 873, 877
(2002).
97. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 624 (1991). Also, “the jury system
performs the critical governmental functions of guarding the rights of litigants and ‘ensuring
continued acceptance of the laws by all of the people.’” Id. (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S.
400, 407 (1991)).
98. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1880). Strauder confirmed the
constitutional permissibility of the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 which prohibited
excluding jurors based on their race. 18 U.S.C. § 243 (2000).
99. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 535–36 (1975).
100. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
101. Id. at 84.
102. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 616.
103. Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 50 (1992).
104. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
105. Id. at 129.
106. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 618 (“[A] prosecutor’s race-based peremptory challenge
violates the equal protection rights of those excluded from jury service.”).
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107
because the product, the jury, is a state actor; and (3) because jury
selection is state action, “courts must entertain a challenge to a
private litigant’s racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges
108
in a civil trial.” The Court had already explained in Powers v.
109
Ohio that generally “[a]n individual juror does not have a right to
sit on any particular petit jury, but he or she does possess the right not
110
to be excluded from one on account of race.” The Court thus shifted
the emphasis from the right of the parties to an impartial jury to the
goals of democracy: “Jury service is an exercise of responsible
111
citizenship by all members of the community.”
112
Jury advocates urge that Colgrove v. Battin, which held that the
113
Seventh Amendment does not require a twelve-person jury,
reduced the jury’s democratic attributes by reducing the odds that a
given jury will reflect the diversity of a community. Perhaps this is so,
but by the same logic, a twelve-person jury is less democratic than a
twenty-person jury or a 300-person jury. Lowering the number of
jurors on a jury certainly reduces the breadth of representation on
that jury, but it does not change the jury’s democratic nature. The
finite size of a jury, the random selection of each jury pool, and the
challenge and dismissal of potential jurors all work together to define
and limit the democratic attributes of the jury. Consistent with the
representative model for the other branches of government, a jury is a
republican institution, although composed of unelected and to some
degree misrepresentative lay people.
All of this is to say that a jury is now, on the whole, more
representative of its given community than ever. Judge Calabresi and
Professor Philip Bobbit argue that as a representative, one-time
player in the legal system, the jury is uniquely situated to make
“tragic choices,” particularly difficult judgments, without risking
either prejudice or political backlash. As they observe, “Juries apply
societal standards without ever telling society what these standards

107. Id. at 627 (“The selection of jurors represents a unique governmental function
delegated to private litigants by the government and attributable to the government for
purposes of invoking constitutional protections against discrimination by reason of race.”).
108. Id. at 630.
109. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
110. Id. at 409.
111. Id. at 402.
112. Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149 (1973). Now, federal juries may be composed of six to
twelve people. FED. R. CIV. P. 48.
113. Colgrove, 413 U.S. at 160.
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are, or even that they exist. This is especially important in those
situations in which the statement of standards would be terribly
114
destructive.”
As John Hart Ely notes, however, the jury is not a substitute for
the legislature as a representative institution.115 Accordingly, a jury
can and should only apply punitive damages consistent with
legislation. Even more, each jury judgment should be reviewed for
the taint of prejudice. Although a jury’s purpose or intent may be
even more inscrutable than a legislature’s, a reviewing judge should
presume that a jury did not act with prejudice when a defendant has
access to the political process. Wealthy corporate defendants provide
an interesting case that will not be analyzed fully here. Suffice it to
say, although corporations may not be represented on a jury by a
director or executive, many jurors have a stake in one or more large
public corporations, and corporations as a class arguably have more
influence on the political process than any other interest group
(including racial minorities, Ely’s primary concern).116
In addition to its role as a democratic voice within the judiciary,
the jury also plays an important role in the constitutional structure of
federalism as a local actor vis-à-vis a national judiciary. A jury may
assign punitive damages, either as a state or federal judicial actor. As
a state judicial actor, its democratic role may be less important insofar
as the trial judge may be directly elected by a local constituency.
Nevertheless, a federal court reviewing a jury’s determination of
punitive damages for constitutionality is presented with the ad hoc
judgment of a group of locals. Because the Tenth Amendment
arguably reserves the right to punish civil wrongs to the states, there
is no serious objection to the argument that states may
constitutionally choose to cap or abolish punitive damages. Pursuant
to that constitutional right, most states, even after the tort reform
movement, continue to vest local groups of citizens with the power to
punish civil wrongdoing. So, although the Constitution is the supreme

114. GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBIT, TRAGIC CHOICES 17–19, 57–64, 186–89 (1978)
(footnote omitted).
115. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
174–77 (1980) (noting the role of statutory restrictions on juror decision-making in capital cases,
and concluding that “[i]t is by reducing, hardly by increasing, the discretion of juries . . . that we
move to protect those who are not so insulated from the sort of ‘unusual’ enforcement regime it
is the point of the Eighth Amendment to preclude”).
116. Id. at 7–8.
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117
law of the land, and the Fourteenth Amendment limits punitive
damages awards,118 this limit should balance rather than ignore the
structure of the federal union. Some deference, at least, should be
given by federal judges to local juries in the interest of federalism.
Further, although a state may legislatively limit the jury’s
punitive damages award discretion, the limits of such legislation—
particularly on the heels of the tort reform movement—should give
rise to the assumption that the people of the state have
democratically chosen to empower the jury to punish wrongdoing up
119
to those limits. This decision should likewise find a place in the
federalism equation.
The jury is neither the equal of the legislature as a representative
institution nor the equal of the judiciary as a legal decision maker.
But both of those other groups collaborate with the jury to govern
this nation. Legislatures and judges, over decades, craft laws and rules
of procedure and evidence with the intention that a set of local,
impartial citizens will, given a carefully drawn set of facts and law,
remain impartial and enforce the community’s sensibility in a given
case. That sensibility may run counter to a state’s majority or
constitutional principles. The appropriate remedy in the first instance
is either remittitur by the trial judge (who may be directly elected) or
state legislative action. The appropriate remedy in the second
instance is federal judicial review, but because of the jury’s political
role as a democratic and local check to the federal judiciary, the
review should constitute a glance back at the jury’s original view, not
a carte blanche revision by an unelected national official.

C. The Jury’s Constitutional Specialty: Morality
Recent Supreme Court doctrine suggests that the jury best fulfils
its role vis-à-vis the professional judge when it provides community
moral standards for tough constitutional questions calling for ad hoc
judgment. The jury adds such community morality to constitutional
law in at least two circumstances: when determining whether a death

117. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2.
118. See infra Part IV.
119. See JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. & AARON D. TWERSKI, PRODUCTS LIABILITY:
PROBLEMS AND PROCESS 634–35 (5th ed. 2004) (providing a catalogue of which states limit
punitive damages and how they do so).
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sentence is justified, and in determining whether material is obscene,
120
and so not protected by the First Amendment.
First, the Supreme Court in Ring v. Arizona held that the jury,
not the judge, must determine specific aggravating factors in the case
121
of murder that warrant a death sentence. This extended the Court’s
122
holding in Apprendi v. New Jersey that “any fact that increases the
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must
be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”123
The Sixth Amendment and Due Process Clause demand that the jury,
not the judge, determine that all elements of a crime that bear on the
appropriate level of punishment are proven beyond a reasonable
124
doubt. Whether a particular factor justifies a sentence of death is a
uniquely moral judgment.125 By requiring the jury to make that
judgment, the Court has in part democratized a difficult policy and
126
constitutional issue.
127
the jury applies
Additionally, since Miller v. California,
community standards to determine whether material is obscene, and
therefore not protected by the First Amendment. The Court in Miller

120. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002) (holding that a jury must find the
aggravating factors that warrant a death sentence); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 33–34
(1973) (deciding that the jury determines whether a material’s dominant theme appeals to a
prurient interest and violates community standards of decency, and so amounts to unprotected
obscenity under the First Amendment).
121. Ring, 536 U.S. at 609.
122. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
123. Id. at 490.
124. Ring, 536 U.S. at 609 (“The right to trial by jury guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment
would be senselessly diminished if it encompassed the factfinding necessary to increase a
defendant’s sentence by two years, but not the factfinding necessary to put him to death.”).
125. Scott Sundby, The Death Penalty’s Future, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1929, 1959–60 (2006) (citing
data that suggest most capital case jurors are trying “to restore the moral imbalance created by
the murder” when reaching a sentencing decision); Scott Sundby, Moral Accuracy and
“Wobble” in Capital Sentencing, 80 IND. L.J. 56, 59 (2005) (suggesting that a jury’s sentencing
decision in capital cases “is inescapably a moral one”).
126. See James S. Liebman, Slow Dancing with Death: The Supreme Court and Capital
Punishment, 1963–2006, 107 COLUM L. REV. 1, 6–7 (2007) (“The Court almost [solved this
problem] by blending both Coverian solutions—excused detachment and justified
deployment—into an ingenious system for sharing constitutional decisionmaking with capital
sentencing juries, state appellate courts, and state legislatures. To achieve its objective, however,
the Court needed to exercise residual responsibility for assuring the integrity of hundreds of
local proportionality decisions while using the aggregate results of these democratic decisions to
inform its own constitutional judgment.”).
127. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
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held that the jury should apply three guidelines to determine whether
a law runs afoul of the First Amendment:
(a) whether “the average person, applying contemporary community
standards” would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to
the prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a
patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the
applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole,
128
lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.

The jury is explicitly told to apply “contemporary community
standards” in determining whether material, as a matter of law, is
protected by the First Amendment. This is the most overt expression
of the Court’s reliance on the jury to inject morality into
constitutional law.129
The Court has not shied away from putting tough questions of
morality on the jury’s shoulders. The reprehensibility of a civil
defendant’s behavior is like the factors that warrant the death
penalty. In both cases the jury, after assessing liability or guilt,
considers the defendant’s behavior holistically in light of the
defendant’s history and the facts of the instant wrongdoing. Although
criminal procedure, and particularly the requirement of proof beyond
a reasonable doubt, further protects criminal defendants, the analogy
is not inapposite because punitive damages are neither as shameful
nor destructive as criminal punishment. Civil defendants are not
stripped of political rights such as voting, do not carry a civil
judgment on their record for life, and are rarely “killed” or
completely destroyed by punitive damages. And the determination of
punitive damages calls the jury to make a unique community-based
judgment of reprehensibility like the determination of prurience, one
that might change over time and draw on local community norms. At
a minimum, in light of Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding the
jury’s role in applying community standards of morality, the jury
should be given more deference in its assessment of civil punishment.

128. Id. at 24 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 230
(1972) (per curiam)).
129. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 106 (“The fact that distributors of allegedly
obscene materials may be subjected to varying community standards in the various federal
judicial districts . . . does not render a federal statute unconstitutional because of the failure of
application of uniform national standards of obscenity.”).
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III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
The Constitution’s text provides little guidance regarding the
propriety of any given punitive damages award. Historically, a jury’s
decision was not overturned unless it was arbitrary or based on
prejudice. Recently, however, the due process requirements for
punitive damages awards have stiffened, at the expense of the jury’s
political power.
An award is constitutionally valid if it is not grossly excessive or
arbitrary in light of the behavior it punishes—or conversely, if it is
130
reasonably proportionate to the demerit of that behavior. If a
punitive damages award is disproportionate, the defendant is
deprived of due process because it was impossible for her have
adequate notice of the legal ramifications of her behavior.131 But this
substantive limit provides no real restriction because—at least in
theory—any award could be justified depending on the
reprehensibility of the defendant’s behavior. So the substantive rule
has no bite until it is joined with the Court’s recent procedural
limitation: a jury’s determination of the reprehensibility of a
defendant’s behavior garners zero deference on appellate review.132
Together the rules provide strong medicine against jury overreaching
on punitive damages. The Court’s concern is the fairness of arbitrarily
exorbitant punishments,133 but its remedy may be too strong when it
merely substitutes its own moral judgment for the jury’s.
A. The Constitution’s Text
The Constitution does not guarantee a right to punitive damages,
nor does it prohibit their imposition. The Court has recognized their

130. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 417 (“To the extent an
award is grossly excessive, it furthers no legitimate purpose and constitutes an arbitrary
deprivation of property.”).
131. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574 (“Elementary notions of fairness
enshrined in our constitutional jurisprudence dictate that a person receive fair notice not only of
the conduct that will subject him to punishment, but also of the severity of the penalty that a
State may impose.”).
132. See Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Group, 532 U.S. 424, 436 (“[C]ourts of appeals
should apply a de novo standard of review when passing on district courts’ determinations of the
constitutionality of punitive damage awards.”).
133. See Gore, 517 U.S. at 587 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“This constitutional concern, itself
harkening back to the Magna Carta, arises out of the basic unfairness of depriving citizens of
life, liberty, or property, through the application, not of law and legal processes, but of arbitrary
coercion.”).
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134
permissibility since 1851, in Day v. Woodworth. Moreover, the
Court has consistently held, both before and after the advent of the
Fourteenth Amendment,135 that the jury’s traditional role at common
136
law in awarding punitive damages is constitutional. Although they
are permitted under the Constitution, the Fourteenth Amendment
limits punitive damages, and few question a state’s power to cap or
137
even abolish them.
A punitive damages award is, of course, punishment. As a
punishment imposed for civil misbehavior, it straddles criminal and
civil law, because the state typically has a monopoly on punitive
power. Although the Constitution does not directly address punitive
damages per se, the Eighth Amendment expressly prohibits excessive
138
fines and “cruel and unusual punishments.” But the Supreme Court
has held—in spite of occasional language to the contrary139—that the
Eighth Amendment does not limit punitive damages. In Ingraham v.
140
Wright, the Court determined that the Eighth Amendment does not
limit noncriminal punishments,141 and, in Browning-Ferris v. Kelko
142
Disposal, Inc., it held that the Excessive Fines Clause of that
amendment does not limit awards in cases between private parties.143

134. Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 371 (1851) (noting that “exemplary,
punitive, or vindictive damages” are well-established at common law).
135. Barry v. Edmunds, 116 U.S. 550, 565 (1886) (“For nothing is better settled than that, in
such cases as the present, and other actions for torts where no precise rule of law fixes the
recoverable damages, it is the peculiar function of the jury to determine the amount by their
verdict.”); Woodworth, 54 U.S. at 371 (noting, before the Fourteenth Amendment, that “[t]his
has been always left to the discretion of the jury, as the degree of punishment to be thus
inflicted must depend on the peculiar circumstances of each case”); see also Minneapolis & St.
Louis Ry. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26, 36 (1889) (“The imposition of punitive or exemplary
damages . . . cannot . . . be justly assailed as infringing upon the Fourteenth Amendment . . . .”).
136. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991).
137. See SWARD, supra note 74, at 303 n.197 (citing various works that note the lack of
constitutional problems with states limiting punitive damages).
138. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
139. See Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 77 (1988) (stating that an
appellant’s challenge to the size of a punitive award “raises a cognizable constitutional challenge
to the size of the award, one based on the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment,”
despite declining to rule on the appellant’s challenge); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S.
813, 828–29 (1986) (noting that whether a large “punitive damages award is impermissible under
the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eight Amendment” is an “important issue[] . . . [that] must be
resolved”).
140. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
141. Id. at 667–68.
142. Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelko Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
143. Id. at 275.
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Instead, the Court’s punitive damages jurisprudence is grounded
in the Fourteenth Amendment, which prevents a state from
“depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
144
145
process of law.” This clause prohibits courts from depriving any
person of “property,” including both finances and reputation,146 by
awarding punitive damages without “due process.” The question,
then, is, “What is due process?”
B. The Due Process Requirement of Notice
Historically, the Court struck down a punitive damages award
only if it was “excessive.”147 A jury award was upheld unless it was
“the product of bias or passion, or if it was reached in proceedings
148
lacking the basic elements of fundamental fairness.” Until 1994,
only one award was held to be excessive: the award was “plainly
arbitrary and oppressive” because “there was no intentional
wrongdoing.”149 Then, in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore,150 the
Court began adding some muscle and flesh to the skeletal frame of
the Due Process Clause.
In BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, after holding that a
151
state may not punish or deter behavior that is lawful in other states,
the Court held that an unusually large punitive damages award does
not comport with the requirement that a defendant be given adequate
notice of potential punishments for wrongdoing. Gore provides three
“guideposts” for determining whether a punitive damages award is
unreasonable: (1) the degree of the reprehensibility of the
defendant’s behavior (the most important of the three guideposts),
(2) the difference between actual harm and punitive damages, and (3)

144. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
145. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948) (expressing the notion that judicial
decisions are “state action” for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment).
146. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971).
147. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974) (“In most jurisdictions jury
discretion over the amounts awarded is limited only by the general rule that they not be
excessive.”).
148. Browning-Ferris Indus., 492 U.S. at 276.
149. Sw. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Danaher, 238 U.S. 482, 490–91 (1915).
150. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
151. Id. at 572 (“We think it follows from the[] principles of state sovereignty and comity
that a State may not impose economic sanctions on violators of its laws with the intent of
changing the tortfeasors’ lawful conduct in other States.”).
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the difference between punitive damages and civil penalties for
152
comparable behavior.
The Court then demonstrated how to apply the guideposts to
determine whether the defendant had adequate notice of the
punishment imposed by the jury. As to reprehensibility, BMW’s
behavior was found not to be egregious. The Court considered
various indicia of reprehensibility: the nature of the wrong (violence
and deceit are particularly serious); the nature of the harm (merely
economic harm is not so serious); and whether the wrong is
153
repetitive. All told, BMW’s behavior was not too reprehensible.
The suppression of a material fact risked, at most, a modest property
154
loss. As to the ratio of punitive to actual damages, although the
Court rejected a bright-line rule, it found that a 500 to 1 ratio of
punitive to actual damages was “breathtaking” given the low
reprehensibility of the defendant’s behavior.155 And finally, as to
sanctions for comparable behavior, BMW’s conduct would not have
been illegal in many states, and—where it was illegal—fines were
usually limited to under $10,000.156 Therefore, every guidepost
ultimately pointed toward an excessive punitive damages award.
The Court’s standard in Gore was predicated partly on a
skeptical view of the jury’s utility as a source of policy. Justice Breyer,
concurring, reasoned that
one cannot expect to direct jurors like legislators through the ballot
box; nor can one expect those jurors to interpret law like judges,
who work within a discipline and hierarchical organization that
normally promotes roughly uniform interpretation and application
of the law. Yet here Alabama expects jurors to act, at least a little,
like legislators or judges, for it permits them, to a certain extent, to
create public policy and to apply that policy, not to compensate a
victim, but to achieve a policy-related objective outside the confines
157
of the particular case.

152. Id. at 574–75.
153. Id. at 576–80.
154. Id. at 579–80. Justice Scalia, of course, disagreed: “Today’s decision . . . is really no
more than a disagreement with the community’s sense of indignation or outrage expressed in
the punitive award of the Alabama jury. . . .” Id. at 600 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
155. Id. at 583 (majority opinion). Compare Justice Breyer’s concurrence, which looks, with
a higher level of abstraction, at the proportionality of the award to the state’s legitimate punitive
goals. Id. at 596–97 (Breyer, J., concurring).
156. Id. at 584–85 (majority opinion).
157. Id. at 596 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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Thus, according to Justice Breyer, because juries are unelected
on the one hand, and composed of lay people on the other, their
discretion regarding “public policy” should be cabined
constitutionally. This is not just a recommendation to the state of
Alabama about the prudence of jury discretion in assigning moral
blameworthiness to particular acts. Rather, there is a constitutional
requirement to present the jury with “clear legal principles” or
“historical or community-based standards,” besides the traditional
goals of punishment and deterrence.158 But what is the source of those
“historical or community-based standards” if not the jury itself?
Justice Scalia disagreed about the importance and utility of a
159
jury’s discretion, writing that, “[t]oday’s decision . . . is really no
more than a disagreement with the community’s sense of indignation
or outrage expressed in the punitive award of the Alabama jury, as
reduced by the State Supreme Court.”160 He suggested that the
majority’s decision fails because it takes to task a “judgment about
the appropriate degree of indignation or outrage, which is hardly an
analytical determination.”161 The majority would likely counter,
arguing that legal clarity at least reduces the risk of juror prejudice
masquerading as community outrage.162
In State Farm v. Campbell,163 the Court embellished the Gore
“guideposts.”164 Before embarking on the Gore analysis, the Court
reiterated its concern about “grossly excessive or arbitrary
165
punishments,” particularly because defendants in civil cases had
“not been accorded the protections applicable in a criminal
166
The Court again asserted that the degree of
proceeding.”
reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct is the most important

158. Id.
159. Justice Ginsburg, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, focused her dissent on the danger
of federalizing a state subject, particularly where the state court offered adequate review. Id. at
610, 613 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
160. Id. at 600 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
161. Id. Justice Scalia later notes that one result of the three “guideposts” offered by the
Court, and the “loophole” where “‘necessary to deter future misconduct,’” is that reviewing
courts will be forced to “concoct rationalizations” to “justify the intuitive punitive reactions of
state juries.” Id. at 605 (quoting id. at 584–85 (majority opinion)).
162. Justice Scalia would not be so concerned with jury prejudice so long as the jury’s award
is reasonable. Id.
163. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 416 (2003).
164. Id. at 418.
165. Id. at 416.
166. Id. at 417.
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167
guidepost. Then the Court, relying on principles of federalism, held
that a jury may not consider “[l]awful out-of-state conduct” when
determining punishment, although evidence of such conduct “may be
probative when it demonstrates the deliberateness and culpability of
the defendant’s action in the State where it is tortious.”168 The Court
hastened to add that punitive damages should be based solely on the
“conduct that harmed the plaintiff,” not any other dubious policies or
actions.169 Further, opining on the second Gore guidepost, the Court
suggested that few punitive damages awards exceeding nine times the
amount of compensatory damages would pass constitutional muster,
except perhaps when the act was particularly egregious and the actual
damages relatively small.170
Although State Farm’s gloss on Gore likely represented an
attempt to avoid explicitly raising the level of scrutiny applied to the
substance of punitive awards, it effectively did just that. Instead of
risk being overturned for constitutional inadequacy, most lower
courts would rather decrease a punitive damages award to within nine
times the amount of actual damages. It is theoretically possible under
State Farm for punitive damages less than nine times the amount of
actual damages to still violate due process (perhaps if the
reprehensibility was very low), or for punitive damages exceeding
nine times the amount of actual damages to be valid (if the
reprehensibility is extraordinarily high and the actual damages very
low). But trial and appeals court judges rarely risk allowing a higher
award. And it is unlikely that the Supreme Court would nitpick an
award less than nine times the amount of actual damages. So, unless a
court is unusually bold, the de facto constitutional rule is that punitive
damages which exceed nine times the amount of actual damages
violate the Fourteenth Amendment.

C. De Novo Review of Punitive Damages Awards
The biggest blow to the jury’s political role in assigning punitive
damages came not in Gore or State Farm, however, but rather
between those two decisions, quietly. In Cooper Industries v.
Leatherman Tool,171 the Court announced that punitive damages
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Gore, 517 U.S. at 575.
Campbell, 538 U.S. at 422.
Id. at 422–23.
Id. at 425.
Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Group, 532 U.S. 424 (2001).
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awards get no deference on appeal, and must be reviewed de novo.
The Court justified its decision to erase the judgment of a jury and
trial court judge regarding the appropriate level of punitive damages
by analogizing to the de novo standard employed in some criminal
contexts that require the application of a complex legal doctrine, such
as “reasonable suspicion” or “probable cause.”173
Moreover, the Court held that de novo review of punitive
damages awards does not violate the Seventh Amendment’s
guarantee of a jury for civil trials because, according to the Court’s
rationale in Cooper Industries, punitive damages are not issues of
fact.174 This is a dubious characterization. Whether the award violates
the Constitution is, of course, a question of law. But latent in the
Gore analysis is the reprehensibility guidepost, which is, at most, a
mixed question of law and fact, and may be characterized as a pure
question of fact. Indeed, that is the very sort of moral
blameworthiness that juries determine all the time. Appellate courts
are as competent as trial judges and juries to apply the last two,
formulaic guideposts.175 But these courts are likely no more
competent than the combination of jury and trial judge in assessing
reprehensibility. Moreover, even if they are, it is neither
constitutionally necessary nor politically desirable for them to make
such decisions.
Justice Ginsburg, dissenting from the Cooper decision, noted her
concern that the new standard comes at a heavy cost with only
speculative benefits. The new review standard may not yield very
176
but it destroys a firmly-embedded
many different outcomes,
177
tradition of jury discretion
and demands expensive, timeconsuming, and clumsy appellate review of trial court decisions.178

172. Id. at 436.
173. Id.; see also United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 336–37 (1998) (holding that
courts of appeal should review proportionality determinations de novo); Ornelas v. United
States, 517 U.S. 690, 697 (1996) (holding that trial judges’ determinations of reasonable
suspicion and probable cause should be reviewed de novo on appeal).
174. Cooper Indus., 532 U.S. at 437.
175. Id. at 440; see Darryl K. Brown, Structure and Relationship in the Jurisprudence of
Juries: Comparing the Capital Sentencing and Punitive Damages Doctrines, 47 HASTINGS L.J.
1255 (1996) (arguing that legal process theory drives the Court’s reallocation of jury
responsibilities to other institutions more “competent” or efficient at making punishment
determinations).
176. Cooper Indus., 532 U.S. at 449–50 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
177. Id. at 444–45.
178. See id. at 450 (“The Court’s approach will be challenging to administer.”).
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Ginsburg responded to the charge that punitive damages are not
issues of fact by noting that there is little difference between jury
discretion to determine noneconomic damages and punitive
179
damages. Despite institutional competence concerns, she believed
the district courts are best situated to determine the “most important”
of the Gore factors, reprehensibility.180
But why is the jury better situated than appeals courts to
determine reprehensibility, and why, therefore, should appeals courts
hesitate to overturn jury awards? Is it because the jury (and usually
an elected state trial judge) has a better nose for wrongdoing?
Perhaps: the jury and trial judge do have the benefit of evaluating
testimony and evidence first-hand. More importantly, though, the
jury has a more democratic nose for wrongdoing than unelected
federal appeals judges. Allowing the jury some room to enforce moral
standards gives play in the joints to federalism, enhances the
democratic legitimacy of judicial judgment, and gives local
communities flexibility to respond to novel or particularly pernicious
forms of wrongdoing that directly affect them.
IV. RE-EMPOWERING THE JURY WITHOUT SACRIFICING FAIRNESS
The Court’s current punitive damages jurisprudence is the
product of an evolution away from the Court’s historical trust in
juries to assign punitive damages, and it dramatically limits the power
of local communities to establish the moral norms that will govern
both themselves and outside entities that wish to do business with
them. The Court’s holdings do not need dismantling, merely finetuning. This Part identifies the constitutionally necessary parts of the
current doctrine and suggests ways to allow the jury greater power to
affect community norms without sacrificing due process.
A. The Need for Balance
The Court’s punitive damages holdings have a great deal of
merit. They successfully excise two unfair considerations from the
jury’s purview: the defendant’s similar behavior in other jurisdictions
which do not prohibit such behavior; and the harm caused to others
besides the plaintiff, for which the defendant may also be liable.
Halting the former consideration prevents the punishment of legal
179.
180.

Id. at 446–47.
Id. at 449.
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behavior and prevents jurisdiction encroachment, while halting the
latter consideration prevents multiple punishments for the same
wrong. Also, in many ways, the Gore guideposts do nothing but flesh
out the long-standing constitutional rule against excessive or grossly
arbitrary punitive damages awards. And requiring de novo review of
the determinations at trial can even be justified on the grounds that
civil law does not provide the same procedural protections as criminal
law against unfair punishment.
The Court did not institute these changes, however, until after a
rash of large punitive damages awards, and the scholars and special
181
The obvious, although
interest groups bemoaning them.
unnecessary, conclusion that can be drawn from the Court’s decisions
is that large awards (perhaps among other factors) undermined the
Court’s trust in the jury’s decision-making ability. In particular, at
least some members of the Court were concerned about the political
authority and competence of the jury to establish appropriate “public
policy.”182
The Court overcorrected. De novo review does more than cabin
jury discretion by preventing certain aspects of the defendant’s
behavior from factoring into the jury’s determination of
reprehensibility. It renders juries constitutionally powerless and their
input meaningless as to the punishment of civil wrongdoing. Juries
may be relevant so long as the punitive damages award—in
compliance with State Farm’s firm suggestion—is less than nine times
the amount of actual damages, but the jury’s determination of
reprehensibility is effectively expunged any time the defendant
appeals. Thus the jury’s power vis-à-vis the professional judiciary is
181. See generally Robert E. Litan, Introduction, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY
SYSTEM, supra note 47, at 1 (“The American system of civil justice, much admired around the
world, in recent years has become the subject of great controversy at home.”); see also George
L. Priest, Introduction: The Problem and Efforts to Understand It, in PUNITIVE DAMAGES: HOW
JURIES DECIDE 1, 1–4 (Cass R. Sunstein et al. eds., 2002) (noting the controversy surrounding
large punitive damage awards); Jeffrey Robert White, ATLA Protecting Your Rights: The Civil
Jury: 200 Years Under Siege, ALTA.ORG, http://www.atlanet.org/pressroom/sreports/t006whi.
aspx (last visited Jan. 28, 2007) (relating the importance of the right to a jury trial in civil cases
and countering critics who claim that civil juries are out of control).
182. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore 517 U.S. 559, 596 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[O]ne
cannot expect to direct jurors like legislators through the ballot box; nor can one expect those
jurors to interpret law like judges, who work within a discipline and hierarchical organization
that normally promotes roughly uniform interpretation and application of the law. Yet here
Alabama expects jurors to act, at least a little, like legislators or judges, for it permits them, to a
certain extent, to create public policy and to apply that policy, not to compensate a victim, but
to achieve a policy-related objective outside the confines of the particular case.”).
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extinguished exactly where the jury is most competent and has played
the biggest political role historically: in the enforcement of
community moral norms. Perhaps the Court assumed that large jury
awards are driven by incompetence or prejudice, rather than
assuming that the system of checks and balances was working as it
always had.
Assuming contemporary juries are functioning normally, and not
prejudicially (for instance, there was no evidence of prejudice in the
Gore or State Farm cases), recent large punitive damages awards may
symbolize late twentieth-century community indignation over
particular types of wrongdoing more than they indicate a trend of
arbitrary judgment. Studies demonstrate that large “blockbuster”
awards happen relatively infrequently, and almost exclusively when
an individual has been injured by the extremely reckless or
intentional wrongdoing of a large corporation—usually a tobacco or
oil company.183 Most important for vindicating jury judgment is the
finding that juries and judges tend to “award punitive damages in
184
approximately the same ratio to compensatory damages” and that
blockbuster punitive awards strongly relate to compensatory
damages.185 In spite of the current empirical studies battle over the
186
effectiveness of the jury, the strongest that can be said is that “[d]ata
reveal a more nuanced and complex picture of judge and jury
behavior than does conventional wisdom, which typically rests
precariously on unstudied assumptions and axioms.”187 But it is
reasonable to conclude that, particularly when balanced against the
jury’s constitutional and historical role, the empirical arguments that
the jury’s role in assessing punitive damages should be strictly
monitored are unpersuasive. That is, even on the empiricist’s terms,
the jury is more a barometer of community morality than a gauge of

183. Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, The Significant Association Between Punitive
and Compensatory Damages in Blockbuster Cases: A Methodological Primer, 3 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 175 (2006).
184. Theodore Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages: Empirical Analyses
Using the Civil Justice Survey of State Courts 1992, 1996, and 2001 Data, 3 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 263, 293 (2006).
185. Eisenberg & Wells, supra note 183, at 176.
186. For exemplary artifacts of this war, see generally PUNITIVE DAMAGES: HOW JURIES
DECIDE, supra note 181, and Neil Vidmar, Experimental Simulations and Tort Reform:
Avoidance, Error, and Overreaching in Sunstein et al.’s Punitive Damages, 53 EMORY L.J. 1359
(2004). For a list of recent publications dealing with the jury, see Eisenberg et al., supra note
184, at 266 n.8.
187. Eisenberg et al., supra note 184, at 265.
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community irrationality. But with de novo review of jury decisions,
that barometer is useless.
B. Alternative Punitive Damages Doctrines
This Section suggests and analyzes the constitutional costs and
benefits of three possible resolutions of the present predicament: (1)
appellate review of jury awards for abuse of discretion under the
Gore guideposts, (2) appellate review of jury awards under the prior
doctrine of excessiveness or arbitrariness, and (3) a hybrid solution
allowing the jury to apply the Gore guideposts.
1. Some Deference to Juries, Plus Gore Guidepost Protection of
Due Process. Probably the simplest solution would be to dispense
with the de novo standard of review of jury decisions, and to review
them instead for abuse of discretion. Appeals courts could still use the
Gore guideposts as exactly that: guideposts for determining whether
the defendant was deprived of due process. But rather than simply
substitute their judgment regarding the reprehensibility of the
defendant’s behavior, courts would give deference to the jury’s
assessment. The downside to maintaining the guideposts and still
giving the jury some deference is that it may allow for an
unconstitutional amount of play in the joints of the Gore guideposts.
State Farm, although not providing a bright line rule for the ratio
requirement, cleared the haze substantially. But appeals courts may
take wildly different approaches in trying to balance deference to the
jury and application of the guideposts. Although this may affect the
uniformity of awards, it preserves the jury’s political role, and so long
as courts generally adhere to the ratio requirement of State Farm, it
provides adequate due process.
2. Return to the Prior Rule, With Important Modifications. The
Court could return to the prior rule and require review of jury awards
only for excessiveness or clear arbitrariness. Almost by definition, the
prior rule comports with the understanding of the jury’s political and
legal role that has predominated in American history. Unlike the
Court’s current approach to punitive damages, it recognizes that the
jury can play an important role in defining public policy in certain
areas—particularly when assessing the relative blameworthiness of a
defendant’s actions. The Court could still allow jury consideration of
wrongs committed outside the jurisdiction. And this rule would not
be affected by the Court’s answer to one of the questions presented
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by the current Philip Morris case: whether the defendant can be
assessed punitive damages for wrongs done against others within the
188
same jurisdiction as the plaintiff. Whether the jury award is clearly
arbitrary is essentially a rational basis review. And ever since Romer
189
v. Evans, animus is not a constitutionally sufficient reason for state
action, so this rule would not only police excessiveness, but prejudice
190
as well.
The greatest strength of this rule, with the appropriate
limitations, is that it does not fetter the jury—it allows the
community’s moral opprobrium to be realized unless it is based on
animus, or if it results in excessiveness. This last caveat is the rule’s
greatest weakness, however: it gives inadequate guidance to courts
and juries about the definition of excessiveness, and so it risks
unconstitutional deprivations of property and untold amounts of time
and money tying up the judicial system with appeals.
3. Hybrid Solution: Jury Application of the Gore Guideposts. A
third option, combining the strengths and eliminating the weaknesses
of both of the other approaches, is to allow the jury to apply the Gore
guideposts directly. This approach would simply put the Gore
guideposts, including the appropriate indicia of reprehensibility, in
the jury punitive damages instructions. This sort of constitutional
judgment is not foreign to the modern jury. In fact, the Court employs
it most often when it wishes to outsource hazy moral judgments, like
whether material is obscene for purposes of the First Amendment,191
or in determining facts that could justify the death penalty.192
Allowing the jury to apply the Gore guideposts would be most
similar to requiring the jury to apply a three-part test to determine
whether material is obscene according to community standards. In

188. Williams v. Philip Morris Inc., 127 P.3d 1165, 1171 (Or. 2006), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct.
2329 (U.S. May 30, 2006) (No. 05-1256).
189. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996).
190. Id. at 635 (“Amendment 2 is [not] directed to any factual context from which we could
discern a relationship to legitimate state interests; it is a classification of persons undertaken for
its own sake, something the Equal Protection Clause does not permit.”).
191. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 33–34 (1973) (discussing the average person
standard).
192. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002) (“The right to trial by jury guaranteed by the
Sixth Amendment would be senselessly diminished if it encompassed the factfinding necessary
to increase a defendant’s sentence by two years, but not the factfinding necessary to put him to
death.”).
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this context, the Court has implicitly affirmed the jury’s role in
making “public policy” determinations, like the appropriate level of
193
protection against prurient media. Whether something is morally
offensive is not, after all, a question demanding a choice between two
opposite answers. Rather, like the issue of punitive damages, it admits
of degrees. A host of policy choices may factor into the jury’s analysis
because, in application of a three-prong test, the jury is
representatively speaking for the community, and not just for a
combination of the predispositions of individual jurors.
Such would be the case with punitive damages. A jury could
impose the community’s norms in an attempt to comply with the
constitutional due process requirements. Then judicial review would
not amount to squeezing the square peg of a jury’s moral judgment
through the round hole of Gore’s guideposts test. Rather, the
reviewing court would simply review a jury determination for
compliance with the jury’s stated objective. Punitive damage awards
which exceed nine times the actual damages would be reviewed for
constitutionality with the assumption that the jury made a deliberate
decision to inflict an extraordinary punishment because it determined
that, in light of the reprehensibility factors, the defendant’s behavior
was extraordinarily reprehensible and deserving of retribution and
deterrence. This approach also honestly admits that reprehensibility
is a mixed question of law and fact, and one that the jury has
historically determined in its role vis-à-vis the professional judiciary.
C. Resituating Fairness
In many ways, this Note enters the current debate about the
jury’s role in assigning punitive damages through the back door.
Scholars evaluate the Court’s current doctrine on punitive damages in
several ways. By far the dominant approach is an empirical analysis of
the jury’s function. Some of these scholars interpret the data to
indicate the inherent unfairness of the jury194 and others interpret the

193. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 33–34 (stating that the jury should decide what constitutes
obscenity).
194. See Reid Hastie, Overview: What We Did and What We Found, in PUNITIVE DAMAGES:
HOW JURIES DECIDE, supra note 181, at 17, 25–26 (noting the biases and unpredictability of the
jury deliberation process). See generally Stephen A. Saltzburg, Improving the Quality of Jury
Decision Making, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM, supra note 47, at 341
(describing the difficulties and inherent unfairness of submitting very complex cases to juries).
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195
data as neutral or favorable for the jury. Another approach is that
of the synthesist, who argues for constitutional coherency and
consistency.196 But synthesism, as an argument for coherence, does not
always offer adequate support for one potential synthesis over
another, and infrequently focuses on a narrow topic like Fourteenth
Amendment limits on punitive damages. Yet another scholarly
197
approach recounts the jury’s historical and political role.
This Note combines the latter two approaches, arguing that
history and the political role of the jury urge the Court to synthesize
the current punitive damages doctrine with the doctrines that
acknowledge the jury as a source of morality in the area of capital
punishment and obscenity. This approach deliberately sidesteps
arguments about predictability in order to resituate fairness outside
of the normative sway of empiricism. But that is not to deny the
legitimacy of concerns about the predictability of punitive damages
awards and the valuable role of empirical studies in evaluating the
jury. It simply rejects the assumption that large awards are
198
unpredictable and therefore unfair merely because they are large.
Rather, understanding the political purpose of the jury as a
counterbalance to the professional judiciary and as a bellwether of

195. Eisenberg et al., supra note 184, at 264–66; Theodore Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges,
and Punitive Damages: An Empirical Study, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 743, 779 (2002); Theodore
Eisenberg et al., Reconciling Experimental Incoherence with Real-World Coherence in Punitive
Damages, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1239, 1241–42 (2002); Harry Kalven, Jr., The Jury, the Law, and the
Personal Injury Damage Award, 19 OHIO ST. L.J. 158, 178 (1958); Vidmar, supra note 186, at
1399–1403.
196. See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution and Punishment, 56 STAN. L. REV.
1049, 1070–80 (2004) (arguing for a uniform constitutional approach to achieving proportional
punishments in both the criminal and civil realms); Pamela S. Karlan, “Pricking the Lines”: The
Due Process Clause, Punitive Damages, and Criminal Punishment, 88 MINN. L. REV. 880, 880–83
(2004) (noting a discrepancy between the Supreme Court’s handling of proportionality of
punishment in the criminal and punitive damage contexts).
197. See Landsman, supra note 47, at 22 (recounting the history of the American civil jury
system). See generally Harry Kalven, Jr., The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 VA. L. REV. 1055
(1964) (denying the notion that judges are inherently better at making decisions than juries);
Landsman, supra note 96 (looking at the historical roots of the civil jury system); Landsman,
supra note 18 (noting the adaptability of the jury in American history); White, supra note 181
(stressing the importance of the Seventh Amendment throughout the history of the United
States).
198. See Cass R. Sunstein, What Should Be Done?, in PUNITIVE DAMAGES: HOW JURIES
DECIDE, supra note 181, at 242, 243 (Cass R. Sunstein et al. eds., 2002) (“If the purpose of
[punitive damage] awards is retribution . . . the analysis would be different than if the purpose of
such awards is to deter (optimally) future misconduct.”). Ultimately Sunstein concludes that
“[w]hatever one’s views about the purpose of punitive damages awards, juries face extremely
serious problems in producing sensible and coherent outcomes.” Id.
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community norms suggests another take on many “unpredictable”
jury awards: American communities are outraged by (often
unregulated) industrial giants who recklessly or intentionally abuse
the goodwill of consumers. In fact, such an interpretation of large
punitive damages awards is both intuitively predictable, and therefore
fair, as well as empirically testable.199 Not only are some punitive
damages necessary to force defendants to internalize the costs of
200
wrongdoing, but, more importantly, the constitutionally-mandated
reprehensibility guidepost is inherently an unpredictable
201
determination. Another interpretation may be that jury awards,
following the example of jury awards in Massachusetts as that state
diversified economically and morally,202 have become more
unpredictable than before because of increasingly diverse moral
convictions and economic situations of jurors in the United States.
This Note, rather than enter the struggle to interpret empirical data,
asserts the jury’s role in two areas beyond the purview of empirical
studies: the constitutional structure of the United States and morality.
CONCLUSION
If the true source of a growing string of large punitive damages
awards is nothing more than the jury doing exactly what the jury
should do, then the Court should take the opportunity afforded by a
case in which the punitive damages exceed compensatory damages by
greater than nine times to reconsider its current punitive damage
doctrine. The Fourteenth Amendment promises fairness, but it does
not define reprehensibility. The historical and political role of the jury
as a counterbalance to the professional judiciary demands—at a

199. Studies suggest, ironically, that jurors are likely to be outraged by pre-hoc cost-benefit
analyses by civil defendants. See Cass R. Sunstein, Jurors and Judges as Risk Managers:
Introduction, in PUNITIVE DAMAGES: HOW JURIES DECIDE, supra note 181, at 109, 110
(“[P]unitive damages awards increase . . . when companies have done [a cost-benefit analysis],
even when a high value is placed on the key variables (such as life).”).
200. See David G. Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MICH. L.
REV. 1257, 1286 (1976) (noting, as regards the deterrence of punitive damages in products
liability cases, that “[t]he greater the product’s profit potential and the less the likelihood that
individual victims will seek recovery, the greater the need for a strong deterrent to reckless
marketing decisions”).
201. See Daniel Kahneman, David A. Schkade & Cass R. Sunstein, Shared Outrage, Erratic
Awards, in PUNITIVE DAMAGES: HOW JURIES DECIDE, supra note 181, at 31, 31 (“Even when
there is a consensus on punitive intent, there is no consensus about how much in the way of
dollars is necessary to produce appropriate suffering in a defendant.” (emphasis omitted)).
202. See supra notes 50–53 and accompanying text.
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minimum—some deference to the jury’s moral judgment as to civil
punishment. Allowing the jury some room to enforce moral standards
gives play in the joints to federalism, and enhances the democratic
legitimacy of judicial judgment. Ultimately, the Court begs the
question about the constitutional legitimacy of large punitive
damages awards when it assumes such awards must be the result of
juror bias. Instead of ignoring such awards, perhaps judges should
regard them as the result of good old-fashioned moral judgment
applied to novel or particularly pernicious forms of wrongdoing.
Reasonable people could disagree with any given jury judgment, but
a judge should be hesitant to substitute her debatable judgment for
the jury’s.

